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Capitalising on the crowd: 
The monetary and financial ecologies of crowdfunding 
 
 
Abstract 
‘Crowdfunding’ is a method of raising money and finance to capitalise projects of various kinds. 
Drawing on the networking capabilities of the internet and software platforms, those seeking project 
funding appeal to potentially diverse audiences who are collectively referred to as ‘the crowd’.  
What practitioners, advocates and policymakers typically identify within crowdfunding is its 
‘alternative’, ‘disruptive’ and ‘democratising’ qualities; that is, it is held to be a novel, digitally-
rendered economic space which has the capacity to challenge established funding practices in 
banking, capital markets and venture capital networks, offering a more open and egalitarian source 
of capital for economic, social and cultural entrepreneurship. The paper develops the concept of 
‘ecologies’, drawn from the geographies of money and finance literature, to advance a critical 
understanding of the crowdfunding economy that is sceptical of its apparent qualities. First, the 
concept of ecologies encourages the analysis of diverse and proliferative monetary and financial 
forms, enabling an understanding that  avoids the binary opposition of ‘capitalist/alternative’ 
economic forms and which differentiates between the variegated crowdfunding ecologies that have 
emerged to date. Second, by foregrounding the intermediation processes and credit-debt relations 
of monetary and financial ecologies, it is argued that crowdfunding may largely replicate rather than 
disrupt the extant institutional and debt dynamics of funding practices. Third, by emphasizing the 
socio-spatial effects of monetary and financial ecologies, attention is drawn to the need for further 
research into the unevenness that mitigates against crowdfunding being as open and egalitarian as 
its advocates claim.    
 
Key words: Crowdfunding; monetary and financial ecologies; FinTech; sharing economy; diverse 
economies 
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Capitalising on the crowd:   
The monetary and financial ecologies of crowdfunding  
 
1. Introduction 
The purposes of this paper are two-fold. First, we want to develop a critical understanding of 
the relatively new but rapidly growing form of money and finance known as crowdfunding. 
Crowdfunding’s purposive appeals to unspecified individuals (‘the crowd’) for capital to fund 
projects with specified outcomes was made possible by the networking capabilities of the internet, 
exploiting what Anderson (2006) has described its ‘long tail’; that is, an ability to aggregate 
geographically distributed resources and assets to build a critical mass which has agency.  These 
processes, which we term ‘capitalizing on the crowd’, mark out crowdfunding as different from 
venture capital or other established funding practices organized through dedicated public and 
private institutions, whether branches of government or banks and financial market agencies. It is 
the distinctive character of these processes, moreover, which gives rise to what practitioners, 
advocates and policymakers typically identify as important within crowdfunding. Crowdfunding is 
widely held to be an ‘alternative’ digital economy which has the capacity to ‘disrupt’ established 
funding practices in banking, finance and venture capital markets (Nesta 2013b), unleashing a 
‘democratisation’ of capital for economic, social and cultural entrepreneurship (Baeck, Collins, and 
Zhang 2014; Dresner 2014; Nesta 2012, 2013a, 2013b).  Our critical understanding of crowdfunding 
will therefore explicitly question the novelty of this digitally-rendered economic space, the capacity 
it may hold to challenge extant funding practices, and the extent to which it provides a more open 
and egalitarian source of capital for economic, social and cultural entrepreneurship.      
When advancing a critical account of the crowdfunding economy, the second purpose of this 
paper is to do so in relation to the concept of ‘ecologies’, drawn from the geographies of money and 
finance literature. At present, academic research into crowdfunding is limited but growing and is 
primarily located in the fields of business studies and digital humanities. Research in business studies 
is typically preoccupied with teasing out why past projects were successful in attracting funding to 
provide lessons for future calls (e.g. Mollick 2014), or proposing theoretical models to explain why 
different stages of start-up entrepreneurship may be most appropriately facilitated by crowdfunding 
(for example, Belleflamme et al. 2014). In digital humanities, research is particularly interested in 
fandom and other affective energies that animate the crowdfunding of artists and performers, and 
typically casts doubt on the potential this holds for transforming the cultural industries from ‘the 
4 
 
bottom-up’. The claims made about the ‘transformative potential of crowdfunding’ have also begun 
to be challenged by geographers such as Bieri (2015: 2431). Focusing on the capital that 
crowdfunding makes available for large-scale urban real estate and infrastructural projects in US 
cities, Bieri makes a connection to a long-standing geographical interest in the tendency within 
capitalism for flows of finance capital to switch from the circuit of production and into the built 
environment (Harvey 2001). We share Bieri’s (2015: 2431) desire to debate ‘the febrile speculation’ 
about crowdfunding and the oft-repeated claims that are made over ‘the future prospects of this 
method of financing’. However, our approach is different, and this changes the terms of debate by 
moving beyond concerns with the switching of capital between circuits and the (albeit increasingly 
significant) process of ‘crowdfunding the city’ (Bieri 2015). Drawing upon and further developing the 
concept of monetary and financial ecologies in this paper, we stress that the processes of capitalising 
on the crowd are variegated, intermediated and uneven, and it is on this basis that we question the 
apparently ‘alternative’, ‘disruptive’ and ‘democratising’ qualities of crowdfunding.    
The concept of monetary and financial ecologies was elaborated initially to account for the 
persistence of so-called ‘relic’ forms of financial activity – high-cost door-to-door money-lending and 
household insurance – in poorer urban areas in the UK during the 1990s (Leyshon et al. 2004; 
Leyshon et al. 2006). These distinctive financial arrangements had survived the shift to an at-a-
distance mode of financial product delivery and market assessment, both mainstream and what 
later came to be labelled as the ‘sub-prime’ sector, in part due to the problems of risk assessment 
and payments collection in areas characterised by economic precarity. In the first instance, the 
concept of ecologies provokes an approach to geographies of money and finance that does not 
regard the operations of monetary and financial systems as singular and always already defined by 
the spatial-temporal logic of a global circuit of capital. Rather, geographies of money and finance are 
composed of an array of more-or-less discrete and dynamic constitutive ecologies that consist of 
specific arrangements which emerge and are more or less reproducible over time. These relational 
processes, which entail distinctive combinations of financial knowledge, institutional and 
intermediary techniques and expert and popular subjectivities, unfold across space and evolve in 
relation to geographical difference, so that distinctive ecologies emerge in different places.  
While holding certain affinities with other relational concepts that inform research into 
geographies of money and finance – most notably, concepts such as network (e.g. Pollard 2001), 
apparatus (e.g. Langley 2015), and assemblage or agencement (e.g. Hall 2011) – the concept of 
ecologies draws explicit attention to ways in which the comings together of relational  topologies are 
uneven in their proximities and connectivity, generating socio-spatial inclusions/exclusions and 
inequalities.  Some people, places, institutions and so on are better connected than others, such that 
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ecologies differ in their scope and resilience. As Lai (2016, 30) argues, ‘the ecologies concept can 
offer … topological finesse around questions of why particular sets of relations are more durable or 
porous, allowing for more precise consideration of power in relational thinking’.  Its deployment has 
enabled economic geographers to explore the relationship between space, institutions and the 
socio-economic status of financial subjects in a range of contexts, ranging from studies of the impact 
of financialization on lived experience in deprived rural areas (Coppock 2013), to the formation of 
more affluent financial ecologies surrounding private wealth management and independent financial 
advice in global cities such as London, New York and Singapore (Beaverstock, Hall, and Wainwright 
2013; Lai 2016).  The concept has also emerged within cognate disciplines, such as anthropology, 
where Maurer (2015, loc 528) has drawn attention to ‘the complex money ecologies of people 
around the world, and people’s elaborate and diverse repertoires for using money as they navigate 
and add to those ecologies’.      
In what follows below, Part 2 begins by briefly introducing the evolution and organisation of 
crowdfunding, and situates the seemingly ‘alternative’ character of this economy against the 
backdrop of concentrated and centralised capital investment and in the context of wider debates 
about the transformations wrought by the rise of digital economies and the so-called ‘FinTech’ 
sector (e.g. Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013; Benkler 2006; Christi 2016; Kostakis and Bauwens 2014). 
Part 2 also underscores how the concept of ecologies can enable analyses of diverse and 
proliferative monetary and financial forms.  This leads us to avoid the binary of capitalist/alternative 
that typically frames understandings of crowdfunding, but instead to differentiate between the 
more-or-less discrete ecologies of crowdfunding that have emerged to date; that is, donation, 
rewards, equity, fixed income, and peer to peer lending. In Part 3 we foreground intermediation and 
credit-debt relations within monetary and financial ecologies. We argue that, despite their present 
diversity, crowdfunding ecologies may largely reproduce rather than disrupt the extant 
intermediation and debt dynamics of capital allocation practices. In Part 4, we place emphasis on the 
socio-spatial consequences of crowdfunding ecologies and call for further research into the open 
and egalitarian qualities claimed by advocates of crowdfunding. Part 5 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Crowdfunding as ‘alternative’? 
The crowdfunding economy operates according to principles similar to those that underpin 
‘crowdsourcing’ (Howe 2009), a method for accessing ideas, knowledge and solutions from 
geographically distributed digital communities (Brinks and Ibert 2015).  Crowdfunding channels 
money and finance to animate economic, social and cultural entrepreneurship, typically providing 
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capital for projects initiated by a range of actors and institutions which can be as diverse as artists 
and performers, charitable and community projects, as well start-up businesses, small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) and real estate investment companies. Crowdfunding has grown very 
quickly in a short period of time, and in doing so, as we outline later in the paper, has produced its 
own distinctive monetary and financial ecologies. In the UK, rapid expansion of crowdfunding began 
in 2011 and continues apace (Nesta 2013a; Baeck, Collins, and Zhang 2014).  Measured by the 
aggregate value of flows, the UK crowdfunding economy grew by over 160 per cent between 2012 
and 2015, reaching £3.2 billion, equivalent to four per cent of new lending to small and medium 
sized enterprises (Baeck, Collins, and Zhang 2014; Zhang et al. 2016).  Crowdfunding has also 
expanded globally (Espsoti 2014), raising an estimated $16.2 billion in 2014 (The Economist 2015a). 
This was expected to rise to $34 billion by the end of 2016, exceeding the volume of money invested 
in venture capital funds (The Economist 2016a). The largest crowdfunding economies by volume are 
in the US and Europe, with the UK industry possessing the most breadth and variety.  London-based 
platforms are regarded as world-leading innovators (Alloway and Jenkins 2015; Moules 2014).   
Mobilising funds to initiate entrepreneurial ventures certainly predates capitalism, let alone 
the emergence of joint-stock companies (McLaren 2013).  However, over the last four decades or so 
there has been a strong tendency for retail banks to lend to consumers rather than SMEs (Erturk and 
Solari 2007), and the provision of capital for new ventures has become increasingly narrow, as 
institutional investors and large financial institutions, including venture capital firms, have become 
the primary intermediaries for funding entrepreneurial projects and company start-ups (Zook 2004).  
Share ownership may have widened considerably to include the ‘fortunate forty’ percent of the 
population in the US and UK (Froud, Johal, and Williams 2002), but this is primarily the result of 
transformations in occupational and personal pensions that concentrates capital and centralises 
fund management decisions in the hands of professional institutional investors (Langley 2008). This 
process of concentration and centralisation has been resistant even to politically motivated efforts 
to broaden the active investment base, such as the attempt to build a ‘shareholding democracy’ in 
the UK during the 1980s and 1990s through the privatisation of public assets and institutions. To the 
extent that direct and active shareholding increased through privatisation, it tended to be in the 
regions of the UK where it was already prevalent, such as London and the South East, reflecting 
existing geographies of wealth, disposable income and personal investment intermediaries (Martin 
1999).   
The development of the internet created the opportunity for individuals, firms and 
communities seeking funding for the launch of projects and ventures to appeal to new audiences 
beyond the community of professional investors and specialised institutions which dominated the 
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provision of capital.  The pioneers of what became known as crowdfunding initially conformed to 
what Lewis (2001) has described as ‘interest-based economics’, where fan communities were 
mobilised to fund artistic projects that would not otherwise reach fruition.  Lewis credits the UK rock 
band Marillion as the first to stumble across what would subsequently be categorised as 
crowdfunding. Their appeal to fandom, emotion and affect was replicated by a growing number of 
creative artists, who offered their output and/or presence in return for money (Leyshon et al. 2016). 
Such processes of capitalising on the crowd were gradually formalised through the emergence of 
organized crowdfunding platforms.  Over time, and particularly since 2008, crowdfunding has 
evolved to cover more activities, with much of the recent rapid growth being generated through 
platforms that operate in markets which increasingly compete more directly with traditional 
financial institutions. 
Although it emerged as a sub-set of crowdsourcing practices and from specific digital 
communities of fans and activists, the crowdfunding economy is now typically framed by 
practitioners, policy makers and economic commentators in one of two related ways. First, 
crowdfunding is positioned as an ‘alternative’ form of financial behaviour, in that it is has an 
institutional base and structure that is demonstratively different from mainstream capitalist finance 
(for example, Baeck, et. al, 2014; Zhang, et. al, 2016). Here crowdfunding appears as something of an 
antidote to the oligopolistic concentration and centralisation of capital investment, a digital 
economy that necessarily cuts against the grain of the mainstream and the traditional, and which 
has the remedial and ameliorative capacity to make funding available to individuals and institutions 
that would otherwise be excluded from capital allocations. Such positioning of crowdfunding invites 
comparisons with the diverse monetary forms of local currency systems. Drawing on notions of the 
crowd and its agency – albeit defined by factors such as locality, co-presence and sociality (Lee et al. 
2004; North 1999) – local currency systems seek to introduce new possibilities for exchange.  Making 
available resources that would otherwise lie idle – like time, skills or everyday assets – local currency 
systems create ‘alterative’ monetary forms which enable individuals and their communities to derive 
mutual benefits through the provision and purchase of various goods and services.  
Second, crowdfunding has been more recently framed as a constituent part of ‘FinTech’, a 
term that refers to a wider set of changes that The Economist (2015a) describes as the outcome of a 
‘combination of geeks in T-shirts with venture capital’. Here crowdfunding is recast as having 
emerged through a fusion of the technological prowess of Silicon Valley with the financial acumen of 
Wall Street and, in particular, the City of London, conveniently co-located in East London alongside 
the high technology cluster of ‘Silicon Roundabout’ (McWilliams 2015). FinTech is broadly 
understood as comprised of three main fields: new payments systems, including cryptographic, 
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blockchain-based-currencies such as Bitcoin (Maurer 2015; Tapscott and Tapscott 2016) which offer 
the prospect of a transparent and secure ledger to record transactions (The Economist 2015b); new 
forms of risk calculation, which expand the sources of information to assess creditworthiness beyond 
the measures traditionally used by credit scoring and credit rating firms to create new metrics 
against which ‘trust’ can be conferred on borrowers (The Economist 2015a), and; new forms of 
lending, which includes crowdfunding and peer-to-peer lending. Such positioning of crowdfunding as 
a FinTech industry (rather than as part of an ‘alternative’ economy) fills it with a rather different set 
of fixed and singular meanings and disruptive purposes. By definition, it is difficult to comprehend 
crowdfunding as simultaneously a creation of the coming together of the most dynamic sites of 
contemporary capitalism and an alternative to established capitalist banking and finance.  
The concept of monetary and financial ecologies provokes an understanding of the 
crowdfunding economy that does not turn on the binary of capitalist/alternative (see, more broadly, 
Fuller, Jonas, and Lee 2010; Leyshon, Lee, and Williams 2003). As Lai (2016: 28) summarises, this is a 
concept that ‘recasts the financial system as a coalition of smaller constitutive ecologies, such that 
distinctive groupings of financial knowledge and practices emerge in different places with uneven 
connectivity and material outcomes’. Not only is it a concept that encourages the careful teasing out 
of the multiplicity and variegation of monetary and financial forms within and across what is 
typically taken to be capitalist money and finance, but it also connects with a wider movement in the 
geographical literature to decentre and pluralise the ‘capitalocentric’ study of economy (Gibson-
Graham 1996; 2006). Adjudicating whether crowdfunding is either an alternative digital economy or 
a manifestation of the financial and technological dynamism of capitalism is to make a fundamental 
error of understanding: it necessarily forecloses an analysis of the heterogeneity and diversity of the 
economic modalities that characterised crowdfunding at its outset and have endured. The binary 
categories of capitalism/alternative are not mutually exclusive within the universe of the 
crowdfunding economy; in other words, crowdfunding is not either/or, but both/and (see Maurer 
2013) 
By way of illustration, and with particular reference to crowdfunding in the UK which is 
marked by its variety (e.g. Moules 2014), we suggest a typology to differentiate between the five 
principal and more-or-less discrete monetary and financial ecologies that have emerged to date; that 
is, donation, rewards, equity, fixed income, and peer to peer lending (see Figure 1). The pledges and 
symbolic compensation of donation crowdfunding closely resemble those found in the monetary 
ecologies of charity and gift giving. The monetary ecology of rewards crowdfunding, meanwhile, has 
parallels with the making of consumer payments by way of pre-ordering and ‘co-producing’ retail 
products (Arvidsson and Peitersen 2013), or receiving future discounts and markers of prestige of 
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some kind. These two crowdfunding ecologies are composed, then, of monetary transactions and 
exchanges that could be categorised, following Gibson-Graham (2006: 71), as ‘non-market’ and 
‘alternative market’. The volume of money that travels through them is significant, especially for the 
capitalisation of projects in the creative and artistic sectors. The most high profile crowdfunding 
platform operating across the donation and rewards ecologies in the US and UK is Kickstarter. 
Established in New York in 2009, by January 2016 Kickstarter had channelled more than £2 billion 
dollars towards almost 100,000 projects.  This money was raised from over 10 million backers who 
between them made over 27.5 million pledges.1  Kickstarter has 15 categories of project, with the 
share of pledges and successfully funded projects illustrated in Figures 2 and 3.  
Figure 1: Principal Monetary and Financial Ecologies of Crowdfunding in the UK 
 
Ecology Funding Recipients Financial 
Instruments 
Exemplar Funding 
Platforms 
Donation Individuals 
Community projects 
Registered charities 
Social enterprises  
None Buzzbnk; GoFundMe 
Hubbub;  
JustGiving 
Rewards Individuals  
Community projects 
Social enterprises  
None Buzzbnk; Crowdpatch 
IndieGoGo; Kickstarter; 
PledgeMusic; Sellaband 
Equity  Start-ups   Shares CrowdBnk; CrowdCube; 
Seedrs 
Fixed-income SMEs  
Social enterprises 
Debentures 
Mini-bonds 
AbundanceGeneration; 
CrowdCube;  
Peer-to-peer lending 
(business and 
SMEs  
Real estate  
Loans (secured and 
unsecured)  
Funding Circle; RateSetter; 
LendInvest; Wellesley & 
                                                          
1
 Kickstarter website, accessed 7
th
 January 2016:  https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav 
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domestic) Individuals Co.; Zopa  
 
The crowdfunding economy in the UK also includes three ecologies where monetary and 
market exchange is explicitly financial in orientation. The world’s first equity and fixed-income 
crowdfunding platforms, Crowdcube and Abundance Generation, both launched in 2011, have 
subsequently been joined by several competitors. Such platforms ensure that the crowdfunding 
economy includes investment ecologies which have strong parallels with those found in venture 
capital and capital markets. Finally, peer-to-peer (P2P) circuits extend unsecured loans to business 
and domestic borrowers.  This lending has grown rapidly: in 2015 business P2P accounted for 47% 
and consumer P2P for 28% of total UK crowdfunding (Zhang, et al. 2016).  In the ecology of P2P 
business lending, the aggregated and interest-bearing funds of creditors are allocated to the projects 
of relatively well-established SMEs. The most recent expansion in P2P business lending in the UK has 
been marked, moreover, by the proliferation of platforms and practices which make possible 
secured loans to residential and commercial real estate ventures (Langley 2016; Zhang et al. 2016), 
mirroring developments identified in the US by Bieri’s (2015) ‘crowdfunding the city’ research. 
Meanwhile, in the ecology of P2P domestic lending those receiving loans from the crowd are 
anonymous and not project-based: would-be borrowers are not made known to lenders, but pooled 
and differentiated according to credit scores and/or the duration of their loan requests. In the US 
the P2P domestic lending ecology – dominated by two platforms, Prosper and Lending Club 
(founded in 2005-6) – has accounted for the greatest share of the expanded scale of flows in the 
crowdfunding economy (Aitken 2015). 
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Figure 2: Number of funding pledges, by project category, Kickstarter (source:  Kickstarter, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav). 
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Figure 3: Value of funding pledges, by project category, Kickstarter (source:  Kickstarter, 
https://www.kickstarter.com/help/stats?ref=about_subnav): 
 
 
 
 Our typology of the UK’s crowdfunding economy is suggestive of a set of dynamic and 
diverse monetary and financial ecologies that require further investigation through empirical 
research.  For example, crowdfunding ecologies may be bringing about new distributions of money, 
credit and debt over space, channelling funds to projects in places that might otherwise be excluded 
from mainstream finance. This might be particularly the case with donation and rewards ecologies, 
as crowdfunding provides an opportunity for funding that is more akin to gifting than financial claim.  
There are parallels here to the exploration of geographies of foreign aid and development 
(Mawdsley 2012), and it would seem especially apposite to consider the ways in which digital 
economies can mobilize and share resources and assets between geographically distributed and 
connected communities of interest.  Indeed, rewards crowdfunding is routinely categorized as part 
of the so-called ‘sharing economy’ which is predicated on ‘taking underutilized assets and making 
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them accessible online to a community, leading to a reduced need for the ownership of those assets’ 
(Stephany 2015, 3). The sharing economy is not a gift economy, for the underlying motive in the 
former is to create value by mobilising (and earning fees from) the ‘excess capacity’ of accumulated 
and underutilised assets (Case 2015).  Moreover, the sharing economy may be seen as an attempt to 
colonize the social economy, and in so doing ‘is a reflection of capitalism’s need to find new profit 
opportunities in aspects of social life once shielded from the market’ (Stephany 2015, 8). The best 
known examples of sharing economy business models utilise excess capacity in physical assets such 
as cars (for example, Uber) and property (for example, Airbnb), but crowdfunding platforms also 
perform this function as they ‘get “slack to the pack”, that slack being spare cash’ (Stephany 2015, 
102), with this otherwise idle money being put to potentially productive use by funding projects.   
Meanwhile, and with reference to its rapidly expanding equity, fixed income and P2P lending 
ecologies, the expansion and proliferation of the crowdfunding is already the focus for economic 
geography research concerned with  the marketization of this digital space economy (Langley 2016).  
Here the growth of crowdfunding may largely serve to replicate established monetary and financial 
ecologies. As crowdfunding platforms seek to outcompete mainstream financial institutions on the 
basis of efficiency and effectiveness – derived from the absence of  legacy costs from branch 
networks and lighter regulatory burdens – they attempt to capture extant flows of money and 
finance and take control of (i.e. re-concentrate and re-centralise) capital investment processes.  
Moreover, as platforms in the UK now target not only ‘the crowd’ but also attempt to attract funds 
in search of a return from institutional investors, there may an advantage for equity, fixed-income 
and P2P crowdfunding forms to be co-located in large financial centres. In the terms of a celebratory 
Financial Times article on the development of the crowdfunding economy, the diversity of the sector 
in the UK is translated into a key strength of London as a global centre (Moules 2014).  We explore 
these propositions further in the next two sections of the paper which will critically evaluate the 
claims made for crowdfunding’s capacity to disrupt and democratise extant arrangements for the 
allocation of capital.   
 
3. Crowdfunding as ‘disruption’? 
In the mid-to-late 1990s, Christiansen (1997) coined the influential notion of ‘disruptive innovation’ 
to up-date Schumpeter’s concept of ‘creative destruction’ for the digital age. It refers to any 
innovation occurring at ‘the bottom’ of a market that makes a product or service more widely 
accessible to consumers, and thereby challenges the offerings and business models of incumbent 
firms ‘at the top’.  According to Stephany (2015: 148), claiming an ability to ‘disrupt’ existing markets 
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for profit has become an almost obligatory part of the mission statement for new tech start-ups.  
While the ubiquity of claims to disruptive innovation often feeds scepticism (see, for example, King 
and Baatartogtokh 2015), the exception seems to be to crowdfunding and the broader FinTech 
sector. For example, Pignal (2015) has argued that ‘there is no doubt that “disruption” has at least 
reached finance, an industry so regulated and politically connected that it once seemed above the 
threat of new entrants’.  The evidence cited for this disruption is that 50 global FinTech companies 
were transacting business worth over $1 billion at the end of 2015, and that a select few can 
reasonably expect that they would shortly be ‘doing business in the tens of billions of dollars – at 
least if their exponential growth rates hold’.   
Banking losses and post-crisis regulatory compliance costs have displaced innovation from 
the traditional domains of the financial sector. New forms of so-called ‘smart money’ and ‘social 
finance’ have taken hold that, for their proponents at least, demonstrate the disruptive power of 
financial market innovation which can solve a host of socio-economic and environmental problems 
(Palmer 2015; Nicholls, Moore, and Westley 2012). Post-crisis innovation and experimentation 
across the crowdfunding economy, encouraged by judicious policy nudges, may be an example of 
monetary and financial disruption which is less voracious and less wedded to the worst excesses of 
financialized capitalism. Indeed, both the UK and US governments have enacted policies that seek to 
exploit crowdfunding’s disruptive potential to open new funding for entrepreneurialism. Through 
the British Business Bank, the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills has funded loans to 
SMEs through crowdfunding platforms.2  HM Treasury (2014) made it possible for funds channelled 
into crowdfunding to be included, for tax purposes, under the new regime for Individual Savings 
Accounts.  Meanwhile, the Financial Conduct Authority (2013, 2014) implemented new regulations 
to provide consumer protections for those contributing funds via crowdfunding platforms.  In the 
US, provisions within the 2012 Jumpstart Our Business Start-ups Act made it permissible for equity 
crowdfunding to provide an alternative source of venture capital to new businesses (Mollick 2014).   
However, any assessment of these disruptive forces should give careful consideration not 
only to the diversity of the crowdfunding economy’s monetary and financial ecologies, but to the 
intermediation and credit-debt relations which are constitutive of those ecologies. As Lai (2016) has 
suggested, the critical analytical purchase afforded by the concept of ecologies – especially as it 
might elucidate the constitutive relational entanglements that make possible monetary and financial 
arrangements – can be significantly strengthened by paying greater attention to intermediation as a 
particular and distinctive form of market institutional agency. In this respect we note that the 
                                                          
2
 Press release.  http://british-business-bank.co.uk/new-40m-investment-british-business-bank-support-450m-
lending-smaller-businesses/ 
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concept of ‘intermediation’ is being utilised more widely to understand the demise and rise of 
institutions during a period of post-crisis structural change in global finance. If we foreground the 
intermediation of the monetary and financial ecologies of crowdfunding, moreover, attention is 
drawn to the techniques and practices of platforms as sites of intermediation across all five of the 
principal ecologies outlined above (Langley and Leyshon 2016; Srnicek 2016). This diminishes the 
claim that the apparently two-sided and ‘disintermediated’ exchanges of crowdfunding are 
genuinely different to, and disruptive of, the traditional practices of banking which intermediate 
between savers and borrowers.  Crowdfunding may be described as ‘zero-sum lending’: unlike 
fractional banking, it does not create private money or leverage debt in order to generate income.  
Profitable intermediation by crowdfunding platforms necessarily turns on earning fee-income in 
return for aggregating and distributing funds,  and fees have also become increasingly important to 
banking profits in recent decades (Erturk and Solari 2007).   
The concept of intermediation therefore requires reworking to more fully elucidate the 
institutional dynamics of crowdfunding. In broad terms, it is more accurate to consider the monetary 
and financial ecologies of crowdfunding as entailing re-intermediation rather disintermediation 
(French and Leyshon 2004). The re-intermediary business models of leading UK platforms are 
variously rooted in digital retailing and venture capital spin-offs from mainstream finance. New 
business relationships are also being generated between crowdfunding platforms, on the one hand, 
and banks or investment funds, on the other (Alloway and Jenkins 2015; Evans 2015). This is leading 
to hybridised forms of re-intermediation that dissipate the purported disruption heralded by the rise 
of the crowdfunding economy.  In the US, for example, the leading P2P domestic lenders began by 
aggregating and directing the savings of the crowd, but now increasingly channel capital provided by 
institutional investors into loans that, for the most part, are used by individuals and households for 
the purposes of refinancing existing debts at lower rates of interest. At Prosper, 80 percent of loans 
that they intermediated in March 2014 were funded by hedge funds, pension funds, sovereign 
wealth funds and foreign banks (Chase 2015: 115-16). In short, as an apparently disruptive force that 
unsettles extant monetary and financial arrangements, crowdfunding actually bears the very strong 
imprint of established intermediary business models and practices.    
Subjecting crowdfunding’s disruptive capacities to critical scrutiny is also greatly assisted, we 
would argue, by foregrounding the credit-debt relations of monetary and financial ecologies. 
Contemporary social theories of money continue to move away from a classical emphasis on how 
monetary calculations squeeze-out social values (Gilbert 2005; Zelizer 2011). They stress that 
monetary exchange is actually a credit-debt relation that produces claims and obligations which 
extend into society and well beyond the transaction itself, and that the circulation of monetary 
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claims and obligations are freighted with communicative socio-economic motivations and meanings 
(Dodd 2014; Ingham 2004; Konings 2015).  We are reminded, then, that while all crowdfunding 
creates monetary claims and obligations through digital payments infrastructures (in particular, the 
PayPal and Amazon payments systems (see Simon 2011)), the distinct values, enthusiasms and 
affects of ‘the crowd’ that circulate and are communicated in each of the five crowdfunding 
ecologies are equally important. Appraisals of the role and potential of crowdfunding in the music 
industry (Leyshon et al. 2016; Leyshon 2014), as well as work in the digital humanities (Bennett, 
Chin, and Jones 2015), indicates that gifting money in donation and rewards crowdfunding is infused 
with fandom for creative artists of various kinds. Yet, a broad spectrum of ‘orders of worth’ 
(Boltanski and Thévenot 2006) are likely to be present across diverse crowdfunding ecologies.  Thus 
fandom and affect are likely to be key drivers in donation and rewards crowdfunding, but within the 
three financial ecologies the behavioural sentiments that animate monetary circulations may be 
more instrumental and closely resemble those in mainstream financial markets (Financial Conduct 
Authority 2013). Here the monetary ecology of crowdfunding may be less a disruption to traditional 
banking and finance than a supplement which, at present, mobilizes the passions of investors 
because it offers relatively high returns due to a confluence of the efficiencies of digital business 
models and post-crisis low interest rates.  
For the entrepreneurial subjects who successfully secure capital from the crowd, moreover, 
the disruption to extant debt dynamics promised by crowdfunding may also prove to be somewhat 
hollow. The credit-debt relations produced across the monetary and financial ecologies of 
crowdfunding are certainly multiple: as anthropological research tends to stress, more broadly, the 
contingent dyadic unity of credit-debt can lead to relational forms which can enable the building of 
community solidarities (Graeber 2011; Peebles 2010; cf. Lazzarato 2012).  And, in donation and 
rewards crowdfunding, the obligations take a non-monetary form that contrasts with the repayment 
requirements of a bank loan. This may appear to be advantageous to debtors. Yet, in donation and 
rewards crowdfunding non-monetary obligations can weigh heavily on those seeking to keep their 
promises to the crowd in ways that echo the reciprocal requirements of gift exchange. Similarly, the 
credit-debt relations of the three financial ecologies of crowdfunding differ from those of 
mainstream capital markets in a crucial respect: there are limited secondary markets in 
crowdfunding, such that creditors cannot easily liquidate their relations with debtors. Each of the 
three financial forms of crowdfunding also display varying levels of connectivity, patience and 
tolerance between funders and fundraisers, but whether these distinctive features of 
crowdfunding’s debt dynamics are disruptive of the prevailing allocation of capital in support of 
entrepreneurship is open to question, issues which we attend to in detail in the next section.  
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4.  Crowdfunding as ‘democratisation’? 
Claims that crowdfunding ‘democratises’ the allocation of capital to entrepreneurs (Nesta 
2012) are worthy of critical attention, not least because of the powerful gatekeeping role played by 
banks and other investment intermediaries is widely acknowledged in critical accounts of 
entrepreneurship (Dannreuther and Perren 2013).  Claims that technology can bring about a broader 
process of social democratisation are longstanding, but have been particularly prevalent since the 
rise of the internet and the possibilities its ubiquity offers for bringing about a new form of 
citizenship (for example, Barlow 1996; Raymond 1999). However, such broad political claims are 
generally considered to be unsustainable and contradictory (Morrison 2009; Best and Wade 2009), 
and they are beyond the scope of this paper. We focus here on more modest claims that 
technological democracy, through the related processes of ‘disruption’ discussed earlier, undermine 
incumbent gatekeepers to allow the entry of participants to various economic and social processes 
into which they would have previously been denied access. In the case of crowdfunding, the claim 
that we subject to critical scrutiny is that it democratises access to capital to fund projects.   
Given how the concept of monetary and financial ecologies leads us to emphasize diversity 
within the crowdfunding economy, it is important to note that each of the five crowdfunding 
ecologies tends to capitalise different kinds of entrepreneurial projects. Crowdfunding may not 
enable a more egalitarian distribution of investment capital per se, but the diversity of the multiple 
monetary and financial ecologies that are held together in the crowdfunding economy may 
nonetheless create new opportunities and possibilities. For example, monetary pledges by friends, 
family and enthusiasts in donation and rewards crowdfunding have become a well-established 
source of capital for the ‘cultural entrepreneurship’ of musicians, filmmakers, authors, and artists 
(Harris 2013; Nesta 2014).  The ‘social entrepreneurship’ of community and charitable projects also 
receives funding within these ecologies. The three financial ecologies, in contrast, typically fund the 
commercial projects of start-ups, SMEs or real estate investors. Certain commercial projects may 
blur these distinctions and contain elements of cultural and/or social entrepreneurship 
(Buckingham, Pinch, and Sunley 2012), but they are predicated on providing a return-on-investment.  
Because of the emphasis that it places on the socio-spatial outcomes of monetary and 
financial arrangements, the concept of monetary and financial ecologies encourages further critical 
reflection on the purported democratising qualities of crowdfunding.  As Leyshon et al. (2004: 626) 
argue, thinking in terms of ecologies (rather than networks and other similar concepts) provokes an 
explicit concern with ‘effects’ and ‘consequences’ of discrete relational arrangements of money and 
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finance, especially ‘the spatial implications of the working through of relations through networks’. It 
follows that a crucial issue for future, geographical research into crowdfunding’s democratising 
capacities is the extent to which it may challenge the uneven geographies of entrepreneurship, 
including its place-based agglomeration, by attracting new investment audiences that may be 
motivated by different concerns beyond a narrow focus on maximising financial return. This may 
create new possibilities that run counter to long-run processes that have generated uneven spatial 
development, opening up possibilities for a form of market-generated but non-exploitative ‘green-
lining’ of investment that traditionally has been the preserve of dedicated institutions, such as 
community development banks and/or government agencies (Li et al. 2002; Wyly, Atia, and Hammel 
2004).   
Through an analysis of the music-based rewards crowdfunding site, Sellaband, Agrawal et al. 
(2015) argue that online platforms are able to successfully attract geographically distant investors to 
overcome the recognised bias towards colocation.  They argue that the ability of artists to attract 
equity funding over space demonstrates ‘that what appears to be a geographic distance effect is 
mostly a social effect’; in other words, while ‘it is likely that colocation influences the likelihood of 
establishing social connections, it is pre-existing social relationships that serve as the mechanism 
through which geographic distance matters’ (page 271). In this sense, as Agrawal et al. suggest, it 
may be that crowdfunding can challenge the received understanding of capitalising ventures where, 
despite widely available knowledge and techniques, being in the right place at the right time is 
significant in producing successful entrepreneurship. Crowdfunding has the potential to challenge 
established notions of the ‘right place’ by appealing over the heads of traditional audiences for 
investment, hailing new subjects that may be connected to ventures through digitally mediated ties 
of affect and enthusiasm. Indeed, it may be that the crowdfunding economy has the ability to bring 
together geographically distributed funders and fundraisers according to the logic of the internet’s 
‘long tail’. Those with shared interests who are separated by physical distance may create online 
ecologies that centre on particular crowdfunding platforms and allied nodal points (that is, social 
media forums, chatrooms, hashtags, etc.).  In that sense, crowdfunding dissolves distance and 
erodes the inequities of location in the way that, as Zook (2005) shows, is the case for many 
internet-based businesses in the United States located in remote and less favoured regions.  It also 
may also pose a  challenge to  established understandings of agglomeration, where localised 
information and knowledge spill-overs are regarded as key to entrepreneurship (Henry and Dawley 
2011; Martin and Sunley 2003).  Regional and urban ‘clusters’ of related industries and institutions 
have been shown to operate more efficiently, and to exhibit entrepreneurialism due to 
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concentrations of technologies, infrastructures, pools of knowledge and other inputs that include 
appropriate and adequate sources of capital. 
Nonetheless, it remains the case that any claims that crowdfunding broadens and more 
equitably distributes opportunities to access to capital for entrepreneurship should be treated with 
considerable caution. It needs to be recognised, for instance, that whether an entrepreneurial 
project receives funding from the crowd is highly contingent from the outset, and that contingencies 
vary across the different crowdfunding ecologies.  This is because the initial eliciting of funding is 
itself a highly competitive process. It is by differentiating between projects, and thereby deciding 
which is worthy of capitalising and which is not, that the collective intelligence and ‘wisdom of the 
crowds’ (Surowiecki 2004) is said to be brought to bear (cf. Borch 2012).  For example, roughly half 
of all crowdfunding campaigns in the UK fail to raise sufficient funding to allow projects to proceed 
(Nesta 2013b).  Successful campaigns have also been shown to require the mobilization of social and 
cultural capital in ways that have equity and exclusionary effects (Davidson and Poor 2014).  Such 
effects are especially apparent in crowdfunding’s financial ecologies. For example, more women 
than men raise funds in donation and rewards ecologies in the UK, but women are in the minority 
amongst those raising funds in P2P business lending (24%) and in equity crowdfunding (22%) (Baeck, 
Collins, and Zhang 2014, 15).  Those contributing funds to donations and rewards ecologies, 
meanwhile, tend to be drawn relatively broadly from across the income and age spectrum. In 
contrast, high-net worth individuals usually provide funds in equity crowdfunding, and it is men aged 
55 and over, with incomes in excess of £50,000, who are the typical funders of P2P business and 
domestic loans (pp 15-17).  Similar patterns have been revealed in the US, where female funders are 
overwhelmingly motivated by the desire to help someone in need, which was a reason for giving to 
crowdfunding platforms in 75% of women surveyed, compared to 58% of men (Smith 2016).  
Meanwhile, men are more motivated to give to support new products or innovations (42%) than are 
women (27%) (ibid.). 
Competition for capital is also enshrined through various intermediary practices of 
crowdfunding platforms, not least the ‘all-or-nothing model’. This requires that projects seeking 
funding set a target to be achieved within a short-term timescale, typically 1-3 months. Indeed, 
many platforms encourage the shortest possible campaign. If a project fails to reach its target by the 
deadline would-be funders have their investment returned. The model’s logic is that short deadlines 
provide a ‘proof of concept’, and an indication of future demand, without which a project is less 
likely to deliver on its objectives. Additional barriers to entry are erected by platform intermediation. 
In the financial ecologies of crowdfunding, platforms screen projects prior to listing, drawing on 
external credit checks and evaluations of the business cases made for working capital or expansion. 
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Investors are also encouraged to undertake their own due diligence when selecting between 
projects (Langley 2016).   
Moreover, the ability of crowdfunding to democratise capital allocation across space –  
overcoming geographical barriers that discriminate against entrepreneurs based in remote locations 
(Zook 2004) – should be qualified because crowdfunding ecologies would actually seem to depend 
on the intersections of digital networks and place-based clusters. In the UK’s crowdfunding 
economy, for example, both the location of platform intermediaries and landscape of credit-debt 
relations favour London and the South East. Many platforms in the UK crowdfunding sector are 
embedded in a place-based urban cluster centred on East London’s so-called FinTech sector 
(McWilliams 2015). While these platforms can reach distributed investment audiences and 
entrepreneurial ventures, the geography of crowdfunding in the UK remains highly uneven. This is 
revealed by an analysis of the regional distribution of funders and fundraising across equity-based, 
rewards and peer-to-peer consumer lending platforms in the UK (Baeck et al. 2014).  London and the 
South East are the most active regions in the UK crowdfunding economy overall: those providing 
funds or fundraising are most frequently located in these regions. Yet, this is a tendency which is 
especially pronounced in crowdfunding’s financial ecologies. For example, 26% of those raising 
rewards crowdfunding are located in London, a figure that rises to 41% in the equity crowdfunding. 
Add the rest of the South East and the result is that over half (52%) of those raising funds for start-
up enterprises through equity crowdfunding are found in these two regions (op. cit,. 18-19). In P2P 
domestic lending, meanwhile, 25% of borrowers live in London and the South East, but 37% of 
funders are located in these two regions (op. cit., p. 18). Assuming that borrowers continue to meet 
the repayment obligations, the aggregations and distributions of P2P domestic lending over time will 
lead to an inflow of revenue into London and the South East.  Although these figures refer to funders 
and borrowers, and not the actual volume of funds, they suggest that London is likely to be a net 
importer of capital to support projects, be they equity-based or rewards crowdfunding. And, along 
with the rest of the South East, it is also likely to be an exporter of capital to fund P2P consumer 
lending.  This net import and export of different forms of crowdfunded capital would likely work in 
London’s favour, as money is imported to capitalise productive new projects and ventures, yet is 
exported to earn income from personal indebtedness within the rest of the UK.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has offered an analysis of the emergent and rapidly growing economy of 
crowdfunding by drawing upon and developing the concept of ‘ecologies’ from the geographies of 
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money and finance literature. Specifically, we have made a series of conceptual and analytical 
manoeuvres that have clarified and deepened the notion of monetary and financial ecologies, on the 
one hand, while critically questioning the purported ‘alternative’, ‘disruptive’ and ‘democratising’ 
qualities of crowdfunding, on the other. The concept of ecologies directs analysis to diverse and 
proliferative monetary and financial forms. Accordingly, with particular reference to the UK, we have 
outlined the anatomy of the five main crowdfunding ecologies that have emerged to date, and 
highlighted how such diversity problematizes the tendency to frame the crowdfunding economy 
through the binary of capitalist/alternative. Connecting with research that highlights the dynamic 
ambivalences of monetary and financial forms, we suggested that crowdfunding is an ‘alternative’ 
space of money and finance only in the strict sense of the word’s Latin root (alternare), ‘implying 
oscillation, a movement back and forth between an “is” and an “as if” rather than a specification of 
an ontology’ (Maurer 2013: 415). The paper has also developed the concept of monetary and 
financial ecologies in two further respects: it has foregrounded the role of intermediary institutions 
and credit-debt relations in the comings together of monetary and financial ecologies; and, it has 
emphasized the uneven socio-spatial effects of monetary and financial ecologies. Each of these 
conceptual moves, respectively, informed our consideration of the claims made for crowdfunding’s 
disruptive and democratising capacities and, to conclude, we want to reflect further and more 
broadly on these claims.   
Firms that embark on strategies to disrupt markets have two targets in sight: incumbent 
firms that they wish to usurp through cheaper and more efficient means of production and/or 
service delivery, and the regulatory structures that help to configure and define existing markets and 
the behaviours within them. In sweeping away incumbents, therefore, disruptive firms also call for 
new more transparent systems of regulation. In the contemporary period, this is best illustrated in 
the blockchain ledger used by cryptocurrencies which is not only publically open for inspection, but 
highly resistant to tampering and fraud (Maurer 2015). When crowdfunding is measured against 
even this relatively narrow and largely economic definition of the objective of disruption – leaving 
aside the possibility that it may also contribute to a socially progressive democratisation of the 
allocation of capital – our analysis suggests that, at present, it comes up well short. In the donation 
and rewards ecologies of crowdfunding, intermediary platforms have tended not to sweep away 
incumbents, but fill a funding gap created by the concentration and centralisation of capital 
investment and exacerbated by the retrenchment of traditional funders of cultural activity, such as 
public funding bodies subject to the politics of austerity and increasingly parsimonious private sector 
companies. Across its financial ecologies, meanwhile, crowdfunding perhaps has greater potential to 
disrupt incumbent firms and regulations because, as noted earlier, it appears to offer efficiency and, 
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to date at least, a lower rate of default.  Moreover, the inability of investors to pass off their debt 
obligations in secondary markets may be the most socially progressive quality of the disruptive force 
of crowdfunding, especially given the importance of securitization and secondary and derivative 
markets in debt for enabling financialization in the past 30 years or so (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007). 
However, even here, the capacity of crowdfunding to be disruptive is based on an assumption that it 
carries forward the disintermediation of finance. But this overlooks both the re-intermediary 
strategies of crowdfunding platforms that we discussed above, and that many of the companies and 
ventures raising money through crowdfunding have done so because they have been rejected by 
traditional venture capital firms as they failed to meet their more exacting standards: crowdfunding 
investors are, according to Stephany (2015, 105), simply ‘less fussy’.   
Our analysis also underlines that crowdfunding’s democratising credentials – opening up 
investment capital to a much wider constituency of entrepreneurship than hitherto – needs to be 
carefully qualified.  In rewards and donation crowdfunding ecologies, access to capital for all manner 
of projects may well have been made available in a way that would not have been previously 
possible. It is also the case that while social and cultural entrepreneurs are not under pressure to 
meet monetary obligations and realise financial returns for their ‘investors’, they nonetheless run 
the risk of turning supporters and fans into opponents and anti-fans if they do not deliver on their 
promises, with potentially serious implications for livelihoods (Leyshon et al. 2016).  The capital 
made available through these particular crowdfunding ecologies also comes without the close 
engagement, guidance and mentoring that often accompanies venture capital funding. Moreover, 
while access to capital is certainly contingent and unequal in a range of ways, it is highly likely to be 
sharply impacted by the uneven geographies of digital and place-based clustering. Within 
crowdfunding’s financial ecologies, meanwhile, the initial success of platforms as providers of capital 
for entrepreneurship would appear to be in the process of encouraging collaboration and eventually 
integration with mainstream finance, as established institutions use the strength of their balance 
sheets to absorb their emergent intermediary competitors.  As the crowdfunding economy develops 
further we suspect that its financial ecologies could also prove to have cyclical temporal dimensions. 
A brief flowering of albeit uneven democratisation may be followed, for instance, by a return to 
processes of capital concentration and centralisation as incumbents absorb crowdfunding platforms 
and other FinTech start-ups. Equally, even if the financial ecologies of crowdfunding were to prove 
increasingly successful at carrying forward the democratisation of capital, then this may actually 
create problems (and possibly a crisis) at a later date.  In Stephany’s (2015, 105) terms, ‘If vast 
quantities of fresh capital from individuals become available, too much money could chase too few 
worthy investment opportunities’.  Similar concerns are shared by The Economist (2016b) in a report 
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on the rapid growth of P2P lending in China.  While P2P lenders usefully offer new investment 
opportunities and direct funding to parts of the economy traditionally neglected by the state owned 
banks, the failure rate among P2P lenders is high.  By 2015, a third of all such companies 
experienced operational difficulties, ranging from ‘halted operations, disputes, frozen withdrawals 
or … bosses who have absconded’ (The Economist 2016b).  As the Global Financial Crisis so starkly 
illustrated, the extension of credit-debt relations to borrowers previously deemed to constitute a 
high level of ‘default risk’ always confronts incalculable uncertainties.  There is a danger, in short, 
that too much democratisation of capital could ultimately lead to a crisis and collapse of 
crowdfunding’s financial ecologies. 
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